Abstract-We study the ensemble performance of biometric authentication systems, based on secret key generation, which work as follows. In the enrollment stage, an individual provides a biometric signal that is mapped into a secret key and a helper message, the former being prepared to become available to the system at a later time (for authentication), and the latter is stored in a public database. When an authorized user requests authentication, claiming his/her identity as one of the subscribers, s/he has to provide a biometric signal again, and then the system, which retrieves also the helper message of the claimed subscriber, produces an estimate of the secret key, that is finally compared to the secret key of the claimed user. In case of a match, the authentication request is approved, otherwise, it is rejected. Referring to an ensemble of systems based on Slepian-Wolf binning, we provide a detailed analysis of the false-reject and false-accept probabilities, for a wide class of stochastic decoders. We also comment on the security for the typical code in the ensemble.
I. INTRODUCTION
We consider the biometric authentication system described in [4, Sections 2.2-2.6], which is based on the notion of secret key generation and sharing due to Maurer [5] and Ahlswede and Csiszár [1] . This system works as follows. In the enrollment stage, an individual which subscribes to the system provides a biometric signal, X = (X 1 , X 2 , . . . , X n ). The system receives this signal and generates two outputs. The first is a secret key, S, at rate R s and the second is a helper message, W , at rate R w . The secret key is prepared in order to be used at the authentication stage. The helper message is stored in a public database. When an authorized user wishes to sign in, claiming his/her identity as one of the subscribers, s/he provides again a biometric signal, Y = (Y 1 , . . . , Y n ) (correlated to X, if indeed from the same individual, or independent, if not). The system retrieves W of the claimed subscriber, and responds by estimating the secret key,Ŝ, and comparing it to the secret key of the claimed user, S. In case of a match, access is granted, otherwise, it is denied.
In [4, Sect. 2.3] , achievable rate pairs (R s , R w ) were found for the existence of systems that satisfy the following three requirements in the large n limit: (i) arbitrarily small falsereject (FR) probability, (ii) arbitrarily small false-accept (FA) probability, and (iii) arbitrarily small leakage between the secret message and the helper message, in terms of the normalized mutual information, I(S; W )/n. Theorem 2.1 of [4] asserts that when (X, Y ) are drawn from a discrete memoryless source (DMS), generating independent copies of a correlated pair (X, Y ) ∼ P XY , the maximum achievable R s , under the above constraints, is given by I(X; Y ). It follows that R w must lie in the range H(X|Y ) < R w < H(X) − R s , where the conditional entropy in the lower limit is essential for reliable identification of an authorized subscriber (small FR probability) and the upper limit is essential for the security requirement. These limitations already guarantee that R w < H(X), which is essential for keeping the FA probability vanishingly small for large n.
As in many proofs of direct coding theorems in the information theory literature, in the achievability part of [4, Theorem 2.1] too, the analyses of the error probabilities are very rough -they are merely good enough to prove the achievability of the desired coding rates in the simplest possible manner. However, these are poor estimates of the achievable FR and FA probabilities themselves when these are considered to be the relevant performance metrics for given R s and R w .
This paper is aimed ar providing sharper evaluations of the FA and the FR probabilities. Referring to an ensemble of systems based on Slepian-Wolf binning, we provide analyses of the exponential behavior of the FR probability, for a wide class of stochastic decoders, which includes the maximum a posteriori (MAP) decoder as a special case. An expurgated bound is provided as well and discussed quite in detail. For the FA probability, we analyze the ensemble performance of the MAP decoder and provide some intuition concerning its behavior. We also comment on the security of the code for the typical code in the ensemble.
II. NOTATION CONVENTIONS
Throughout the paper, random variables will be denoted by capital letters, specific values they may take will be denoted by the corresponding lower case letters, and their alphabets will be denoted by calligraphic letters. Random vectors and their realizations will be denoted, respectively, by capital letters and the corresponding lower case letters, both in the bold face font. Their alphabets will be superscripted by their dimensions. For example, the random vector X = (X 1 , . . . , X n ), (n -positive integer) may take a specific vector value x = (x 1 , . . . , x n ) in X n , the n-th order Cartesian power of X , which is the alphabet of each component of this vector. Sources and channels will be denoted by the letter P or Q, subscripted by the names of the relevant random variables/vectors and their conditionings, if applicable, following the standard notation conventions, e.g., Q X , P Y |X , and so on. When there is no room for ambiguity, these subscripts will be omitted. The probability of an event G will be denoted by Pr{G}, and the expectation operator with respect to (w.r.t.) a probability distribution P will be denoted by E P {·}. Again, the subscript will be omitted if the underlying probability distribution is clear from the context. The entropy of a generic distribution Q on X will be denoted by H Q (X). For two positive sequences a n and b n , the notation a n · = b n will stand for equality in the exponential scale, that is, lim n→∞ The empirical distribution of a sequence x ∈ X n , which will be denoted byP x , is the vector of relative frequencieŝ P x (x) of each symbol x ∈ X in x. The type class of x ∈ X n , denoted T (P x ), is the set of all vectors x withP x =P x . Information measures associated with empirical distributions will be denoted with 'hats' and will be subscripted by the sequences from which they are induced. For example, the entropy associated withP x , which is the empirical entropy of x, will be denoted byĤ x (X). Similar conventions will apply to the joint empirical distribution, the joint type class, the conditional empirical distributions and the conditional type classes associated with pairs (and multiples) of sequences of length n. Accordingly,P xy will be the joint empirical distribution of (x, y) = {(x i , y i )} n i=1 , and T (P xy ) will denote the joint type class of (x, y). Similarly, T (P x|y |y) will stand for the conditional type class of x given y,Ĥ xy (X, Y ) will designate the empirical joint entropy of x and y,Ĥ xy (X|Y ) will be the empirical conditional entropy,Î xy (X; Y ) will denote empirical mutual information, and so on. We will also use similar rules of notation in the context of a generic distribution, Q XY (or Q, for short): we use T (Q X ) for the type class of sequences with empirical distribution Q X , H Q (X) -for the corresponding empirical entropy, T (Q XY ) -for the joint type class x, T (Q X|Y |y) -for the conditional type class of x given y, H Q (X, Y ) -for the joint empirical entropy, H Q (X|Y ) -for the conditional empirical entropy, I Q (X; Y ) -for the empirical mutual information, and so on. We will also use the customary notation for the weighted divergence,
III. SETUP AND OBJECTIVES
Consider the following system model for biometric identification. An enrollment source sequence, x = (x 1 , . . . , x n ), which is a realization of the random vector X = (X 1 , . . . , X n ), that emerges from a discrete memoryless source (DMS), P X , with a finite alphabet X , is fed into an enrollment encoder, E, that produces two outputs: a secret key, s (a realization of a random variable S), and a helper message, w (a realization of W ), taking on values in finite alphabets, S n = {0, 1, . . . , e nRs } and W n = {0, 1, . . . , e nRw }, respectively, where R s is the secret-key rate, and R w is the helper-message rate. This encoding is the enrollment stage. We consider the ensemble of enrollment encoders, {E}, generated by random binning, where for each x ∈ X , one selects independently at random, both a secret key and a helper message, under the uniform distributions across S n and W n , respectively. In other words, denoting by w = f (x) and s = g(x), the randomly selected bin assignments for both outputs, it is assumed that the 2|X | n random variables {f (x), g(x)} x∈X n are independent.
The authentication decoder, A, which is aware of the randomly selected encoder, E, is fed by the helper message w and an authentication source sequence, y = (
, that is produced at the output of a discrete memoryless channel (DMC), P Y |X , with a finite output alphabet Y, that is fed by x. The output of the authentication decoder isŝ = U (y, w) (a realization ofŜ), which is an estimate (possibly, randomized) of the secret key, s. Ifŝ = s, access to the system is granted, otherwise, it is denied. This decoding is the authentication stage.
The optimal estimator of s, based on (y, w), in the sense of minimum Pr{Ŝ = S}, is the maximum a posteriori probability (MAP) estimator, given bŷ
where P (x|y) (shorthand notation for P X|Y (x|y)) is the posterior probability of X = x given Y = y, that is induced by the product distribution, P XY (and the subscript XY will sometimes be suppressed for simplicity). We expand the scope and study a more general class of decoders. This is a class of generalized stochastic likelihood decoders [6] , [7] , [8] , [10] , where the decoder randomly selects its estimateŝ according to the posterior
where the function a(·), henceforth referred to as the decoding metric, is any continuous function ofP xy . We will refer to the numerator of the r.h.s. asP (s, w|y), and to the denominator as P (w|y). For a(P xy ) = x∈X y∈YP xy (x, y) ln P (x|y), we have the ordinary likelihood decoder like in [7] , [8] , [10] . For a(P xy ) = β x∈X y∈YP xy (x, y) ln P (x|y),
β being a free parameter, we have a family of decoders, with β controlling the skewedness of the posterior. In particular, β → ∞ leads to the ordinary MAP decoder,ŝ MAP . Other
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choices are associated with mismatched metrics, a(P xy ) = x∈X y∈YP xy (x, y) ln P (x|y), P being different from P , and a(P xy ) = −βĤ xy (X|Y ), which for β → ∞ approaches the minimum entropy decoder.
An unauthorized user (i.e., an imposter), who claims for a given identity, does not have the correlated biometric data y. The best s/he can do is estimate s based on w, and then forge any fake biometric dataỹ, which together with w, would cause the decoder to output this estimate of s. More precisely, the imposter first estimates s according tõ
and then generates anyỹ ∈ Y n such that U (ỹ, w) =s, and uses it as the biometric signal for authentication.
Our objectives are to obtain: (i) ensemble-tight, exponential error bounds forP FR = Pr{Ŝ = S} associated with (2), as well as an expurgated bound using the methodology of [6, Theorem 2], and (ii) an exponential error bound forP FA = Pr{S = S}. Finally, we provide an outline of the leakage, I(S; W ), for a typical code, E, in the large n limit.
IV. FALSE-REJECT ERROR ANALYSIS A. Random Coding Exponent
Consider the system of Section III, along with the generalized stochastic likelihood decoder (2) . Define
and
Our first result is the following. Theorem 1:
A few comments are in order.
1. Theorem 1 asserts that E FR r (R w ) is the exact random coding FR exponent, not just a lower bound.
2. The FR random coding exponent, E FR r (R w ), depends only on R w , not on R s . This fact is not trivial, but the intuition is the following: to estimate S correctly, with high probability, there should be essentially no ambiguity in defining what the correct S is. This will be the case if there is essentially only one X that is responsible for the given W and then this X would dictate the correct S = g(X). This in turn would happen as long as R w > H(X|Y ). Otherwise, if more than one X (in the same conditional type class given Y as the correct one) is mapped by the encoder to the same helper message, then at least one such source vector is likely to be mapped to a different secret key message, and then the decoding would be ambiguous. It appears then that correct estimation of S is essentially equivalent to correct estimation of X, as in ordinary Slepian-Wolf decoding [3] (see also [9] and references therein), where there is no secret key at all (or alternatively, R s → ∞). Indeed, the Slepian-Wolf coding component of the joint source-channel coding system, analyzed in [6, Section IV] under the generalized likelihood decoder, contributes the very same error exponent as asserted in Theorem 1.
3. It is interesting to examine a few decoding metrics. Letting a(Q) = −H Q (X|Y ), it is easy to see (in the full version) that
which, together with (6), yields the same random coding exponent as the optimal MAP decoder for Slepian-Wolf decoding (see also [6] and [7] ). More generally, the same comment applies to a(Q) = −βH Q (X|Y ) for every β ≥ 1, where β → ∞ pertains to the deterministic universal minimum entropy decoding. For a(Q) = βE Q ln P (X|Y ), we have a finite-temperature likelihood decoder. For β → ∞, we are back to the ordinary MAP decoder, which yields
which, together with (6), yields the random coding exponent of the MAP decoder. As argued above, this is the same as the exponent achieved by a(Q) = −βH Q (X|Y ) for all β ≥ 1.
B. Expurgated Bound
Our expurgated bound will be asserted for each type class of source vectors separately. As in channel coding, where expurgation is associated with elimination of some 'bad' codewords of a randomly generated code, here too, we might need to eliminate a small fraction of bad source vectors from T (Q X ), in order to guarantee a certain FR performance level for each one of the remaining members of T (Q X ). One may wonder what would be the justification for such an elimination, as these are generated by the source and given to us, and they are not under our control. Nonetheless, in the context of biometric identification system described in Section III, where {x} are the enrollment signals, there are two ways to justify this elimination. (i) In the enrollment stage, if the individual that subscribes has generated a 'forbidden' source vector x (that has been eliminated in the expurgation process), s/he might be asked to provide a biometric signal again, with the hope that this time a 'legitimate' source vector will be generated. The probability that this would happen is small in the first place, provided that the fraction of vectors eliminated from T (Q X ) is small. The probability of bothering the subscriber more than once with the request of a repeated measurement is even much smaller. (ii) Considering the fact that x may be digitized with some precision, it is conceivable to think of the enrollment data as having undergone vector quantization. Once x is thought of as an output of a vector quantizer, then not every member of T (Q X ) must be a legitimate codebook vector.
To present the expurgated exponent, a few additional definitions are needed. For a given Q Y , let
where the supremum is over all Q X|Y } such that H Q (X|Y ) > R w . Next, define
and for a given Q X , define
12) where the infimum is over all {Q X |X } such that H Q (X |X) ≥ R w . Finally, let P FR (E|x) denote the FR probability of a given encoder E, conditioned on X = x.
Theorem 2: Let {δ n } n≥1 be a positive sequence tending to zero such that nδ n → ∞. Then, there exists a code E such that for every Q X ,
for every x ∈ T (Q X ) \ B(Q X ), where B(Q X ) is a subset of T (Q X ), whose size does not exceed e −nδn |T (Q X )|. A few points concerning Theorem 2 should be discussed. 1. The expression of E FR ex (R w , Q X ) has some analogy to the Csiszár-Körner-Marton (CKM) expurgated exponent of channel coding [2, p. 165, Problem 10.18]. The term Λ(Q XX ) plays the same role as the expected Bhattacharyya distance in the CKM expurgated exponent, whereas H Q (X |X) is analogous to the coding rate R in channel coding and R w is parallel to the empirical mutual information between channel codewords. Roughly speaking, the contribution of a single incorrect source vector x to the FR probability is about exp{−nΛ(Q XX ) provided that (x, x ) ∈ T (Q XX ) (the pairwise error event). This probability should be multiplied by the typical number of such incorrect source vectors within T (Q X |X |x) that are encoded into the same given helper message and hence may cause confusion. This number is of the exponential order exp{n[H Q (X |X) − R w ]}, provided that H Q (X |X) − R w > 0, and it vanishes otherwise.
2. In contrast to Theorem 1, here we are no longer arguing about ensemble-tightness. There is actually one step in the derivation where exponential tightness might be compromised. Specifically, in one of the steps of this analysis, the denominator of (2) is lower bounded by a relatively simple single-letter bound that holds true for the vast majority of encoders, {E}, in the ensemble. By doing this, possible gaps to these bounds may not be fully exploited, and we cannot rule out the possibility that this causes some loss of tightness. On the other hand, the derivation of the expurgated bound includes a certain degree of freedom that does not exist in the random coding bound of Theorem 1, and upon exploiting this degree of freedom, we obtain a result, which is at least as strong as the random coding bound, and sometimes strictly so.
3. The sequence δ n tends to zero in order not to slow down the exponential decay rate, but it is also required that nδ n → ∞ to guarantee that the set of 'bad' source vectors, B(Q X ), would be a minority of T (Q X ) for large n.
4. In the full paper, we show that for every R w , the overall expurgated exponent (taking into account all types, {Q X }) cannot be worse than E FR r (R w ), at least for a(Q XY ) = −βH Q (X|Y ), which was shown to be as good as the optimal decoding metric in the ordinary random coding sense. This is in contrast to the traditional expurgated exponent, which improves on the random coding exponent only at a certain range of rates, but is inferior to the random coding exponent elsewhere (see also [6] , where a similar finding was observed for a particular numerical example).
5. The asserted expurgated exponent is obtained from an intermediate expression that depends on a free parameter ρ that undergoes optimization. It is interesting to observe what happens when we set ρ = 1 instead of optimizing over ρ. This would correspond to the ordinary ensemble average, which needs no expurgation. In this case, E FR ex (R w , Q X ) would be replaced by
where we have used the identity
Therefore, the expression of E 1 (R w , Q X ) is exactly like that of E FR ex (R m , Q X ), except that the constraint, H Q (X |X) ≥ R w , is removed. It follows that E FR ex (R w , Q X ) is expected to improve on E 1 (R w , Q X ) at high rates, where the constraint may be active. It also follows that E 1 (R w , Q X ) is never smaller than the random coding FR exponent given the type Q X , since the latter lacks this constraint as well. The reason that this expurgated exponent is nowhere worse than the random coding exponent is that we do not use the inequality
1/ρ (holding for ρ ≥ 1), like in the traditional expurgated bound. This inequality causes a loss of tightness. Without it, the supremum over ρ is always achieved at ρ → ∞.
6. The case of ordinary MAP decoding is obtained as a special case of (3) in the limit β → ∞. As in (9) , when the objective function to be minimized over {Q XX Y )}, contains a term like β · G(Q XX Y ) (for some functional G(·)), then in the limit of β → ∞, it is replaced by a constraint of the form G(Q XX Y ) ≤ 0.
V. FALSE-ACCEPT ERROR ANALYSIS
Here we analyze the ensemble performance from the viewpoint of an imposter who makes an attempt to estimate S without access to Y , and we are interested in the exponent of the FA probability. As described in Section III, we assume that the imposter estimates S using the MAP estimator, based on W only. As defined in Section III, we denotē P FA = Pr{S = S}, i.e., the probability of correct decoding (FA), averaged over the ensemble of codes {E}. Let us define
Our main result, in this section, is the following.
Theorem 3:P
This exponential error bound is quite intuitive and can easily be understood even if the imposter is informed about the type 1 Q X of X. There are about e n[H Q (X)−Rw]+ source sequences of type Q X (including the correct one), whose helper message is the given W . If [H Q (X)−R w ] + > R s , then all possible e nRs members of the secret-message set would be likely to appear as encoded secret messages among those sequences, approximately evenly, so the probability of guessing the correct one is about e −nRs . If [H Q (X) − R w ] + < R s , then it is likely that there would be about e n[H Q (X)−Rw]+ different s-messages, so the probability of guessing the correct one is the reciprocal, e −n[H Q (X)−Rw]+ . It is easy to see that E FA (R w , R s ) vanishes for R w > H(X), as expected. Observe that here, in contrast to the FR bounds of Section IV, the exponent depends on both R w and R s , not only on R w . As expected, it is increasing in R s and decreasing in R w . The FA exponent also has a matching converse.
As shown in the full paper, the FA error exponent of Theorem 3 can also be presented in a Gallager-style form:
VI. INFORMATION LEAKAGE FOR THE TYPICAL CODE We now provide an outline for the evaluation of the secrecy, or the information leakage, I(W ; S), associated with the typical code, E, in the ensemble. We envision the typical code as a code with the following properties: (i) For any given T (Q X ) whose size is larger than e n(Rs+Rw) , the number of members of T (Q X ) mapped each one of the e n(Rs+Rw) pairs (s, w) is exactly the same (uniform distribution of (S, W ) within the type), so that H(S, W |X ∈ T (Q X )) = n(R s + R w ).
(ii) For any T (Q X ) whose size is smaller than e n(Rs+Rw) , each member of T (Q X ) is mapped to a different pair (s, w), so that H(S, W |X ∈ T (Q X )) = log |T (Q X )|.
As shown in the full paper, the leakage I(S; W ) will then be essentially upper bounded by nE{[R s + R w −Ĥ X (X)] + }. Now, assuming that H(X) > R s +R w , the probability of falling in a type class T (P x ) with R s + R w −Ĥ x (X) > 0 is of the exponential order of exp{−nE sec (R s + R w )}, where E sec (R) ∆ = min{D(Q X P X ) : H Q (X) ≤ R}, and therefore,
which means that as long as H(X) > R s +R w , strong security is guaranteed in the sense that I(S; W ) tends to zero even without normalization by n, as it decays exponentially fast. The secrecy exponent depends on R s and R w only via their sum, R s + R w .
In the revised version of the full paper, we also show that the privacy leakage, I(X; W )/n ≤ R w + O((log n)/n), and R w can be chosen arbitrarily close to H(X|Y ) (at the expense of a small FR exponent).
